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Abstract
This paper develops linear quadratic robust control theory for a
class of spatially invariant distributed control systems that appear in
areas of economics such as New Economic Geography, management of
ecological systems, optimal harvesting of spatially mobile species, and
the like. Since this class of problems has an in￿nite dimensional state
and control space it would appear analytically intractable. We show
that by Fourier transforming the problem, the solution decomposes into
a countable number of ￿nite state space robust control problems each
of which can be solved by standard methods. We use this convenient
property to characterize hot spots￿which are points in the transformed
space that correspond to ￿breakdown￿ points in conventional ￿nite
dimensional robust control, or where instabilities appear or where the
value function loses concavity. We apply our methods to a spatial
extension of a well known optimal ￿shing model.
Keywords: Distributed parameter systems, robust control, spatial
invariance, hot spot, agglomeration.
JEL Classi￿cation: C61, C65, Q22
1 Introduction
Two issues have attracted considerable interest in economic theory recently.
The ￿rst is decision making when the decision maker is trying to make good
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1choices when she regards her model not as the correct one but as an approx-
imation of the correct one, or to put it di⁄erently, when the decision maker
has concerns about possible misspeci￿cations of the correct model and wants
to incorporate these concerns into the decision-making rules (e.g., Salmon
2002; Hansen and Sargent 2001, 2008; Hansen et al. 2006; JET 2006). The
second is decision making when the spatial dimension of underlying problem
is explicitly taken into account and the decision maker or a regulator seeks
to determine spatially dependent rules. In economics, the spatial dimension
has been brought into the picture through new economic geography models
(e.g., Krugman 1996, Boucekkine et al. 2009, Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
2009), but also through models of resource management (e.g. Sanchirico
and Wilen 1999, Smith et al. 2009, Brock and Xepapadeas 2008, 2010). In
￿elds like biology or automatic control, systems with spatially distributed
parameter aspects in the dynamics have been used to study pattern forma-
tion on biological agents (e.g., Murray 2003), the control of in￿nite platoons
of vehicles over time (e.g., Bamieh et al. 2002, Curtain et al. 2008), or
groundwater management (e.g., Leizarowitz 2008).
The purpose of the present paper is to bring together these two branches
of the literature by studying dynamic economic models with explicit spatial
dependence when a regulator has concerns about possible misspeci￿cations
of the spatiotemporal evolution of the phenomenon. That is, the regulator
regards her model as an approximation of the correct spatiotemporal dy-
namics and seeks spatially dependent regulation that performs well under
the approximating model.
The contribution of this uni￿cation is that it allows us to study the op-
timal regulation of spatially interconnected distributed parameter systems
when concerns about model misspeci￿cation vary across the spatial domain.
Concerns about model misspeci￿cation, following Hansen et al. (2006) or
Hansen and Sargent (2008), means that the regulator distrusts her model
and wants good decisions over a cloud of models that surrounds the regula-
tor￿ s approximating or benchmark model, which are di¢ cult to distinguish
with ￿nite data sets. The good or robust decisions are obtained by introduc-
ing a ￿ctitious ￿ adversarial agent￿which we will refer to as Nature. Nature
promotes robust decision rules by forcing the regulator, who seeks to max-
imize an objective, to explore the fragility of decision rules to departures
from the benchmark model. A robust decision rule to model misspeci￿ca-
2tion means that lower bounds to the rule￿ s performance are determined by
Nature ￿the adversarial agent ￿who acts as a minimizing agent when con-
structing these lower bounds. Hansen et al. (2006) show that robust control
theory can be interpreted as a recursive version of max-min expected utility
theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). In this context the decision maker
cannot or does not formulate a single probability model and maximizes ex-
pected utility assuming the probability weights are chosen by Nature, the
adversarial agent.
When robust control theory is combined with distributed parameter
models, it provides a method for studying robust regulation when the cloud
of models surrounding the benchmark model di⁄ers among spatial locations.
Thus the regulator can design the decision rules not only with respect to the
spatial characteristics of the problem but also with respect to the degree to
which the regulator distrusts her model across locations. This means that if
concerns about the benchmark model in a given site deviate from concerns
in other sites, a spatially dependent robust rule should capture these dif-
ferences. This observation allows us to formally identify, for the ￿rst time
to our knowledge in economics, spatial hot spots ￿which are sites where
robust control breaks down ￿or sites where robust control is very costly as
a function of the degree of the regulator￿ s concern about model misspeci￿ca-
tion. We are also able to identify spatial hot spots where the need to apply
robust control induces spatial agglomerations and breaks down spatial sym-
metry. From the theory point of view this is, as far as we know, a new source
for generating spatial patterns as compared to the classic Turing di⁄usion
induced instability (Turing 1952) and the more recently identi￿ed optimal
di⁄usion or spatial-spillover-induced instabilities (Brock and Xepapadeas,
2008, 2009, 2010).
This uni￿cation brings up another point which could be associated with
applied policy design and regulation. It has been argued recently (e.g.,
Haldane 2009) that increased interconnectedness among networks has made
various networks, such as ecological networks, power grid networks, trans-
portation networks, ￿nancial networks more unstable. This interconnected-
ness and the instabilities generated at hot spots are captured in our model
by the distributed parameter aspect.1
1Although we choose to interpret the characteristics associated with the distributed
parameter aspect as physical space, the notion of ￿space￿does not have to be physical.
3Distributed parameter models result in optimal control problems in in-
￿nite dimensional spaces. By using Fourier methods and exploiting the
property of spatial invariance of a class of linear quadratic problems, we are
able to obtain solutions to in￿nite dimensional problems, by solving parame-
terized ￿nite-dimensional problems. Furthermore, by showing how to obtain
correct linear quadratic approximations ￿in the sense of Magill (1977a,b)
and Benigno and Woodford (2006) ￿of nonlinear distributed parameter ro-
bust control problems, we obtain solutions of in￿nite dimensional robust
control problems in terms of linear quadratic approximations of parameter-
ized families of ￿nite dimensional problems. We consider this to be another
contribution of this paper.
In sections 2 and 3 we present our theory and we de￿ne hot spots. In
section 4 we apply our theory to a classic model of commercial ￿shing (Smith
1969) where spatial interconnections in economic and biological variables are
captured by local and non-local spatial e⁄ects. We show how a regulator
could design optimal spatiotemporal robust control for this ￿shery, how hot
spots emerge, and what implications they might have for regulation.
2 Robust control in stochastic distributed para-
meter systems
We consider a distributed parameter control system where the state and
the control functions are respectively represented by real functions x(t;z)
and u(t;z) of time t 2 [0;1) := T ; and a variable z 2 Z; where Z is a
domain that describes a dimension di⁄erent from the temporal dimension,
along which the state and the control functions evolve. Thus Z could be
interpreted as a spatial domain, implying that we study spatiotemporal evo-
lutions, or a domain de￿ning social characteristics or describing varieties of
goods or sectors of the economy. Technically, and in order to develop a
general framework of analysis, Z is a locally compact Abelian group (see for
example Rudin (1962) for de￿nitions). Special cases of Z include the real
line R; the unit circle @D; the integers Z; or the ￿nite group of integers mod-
ulo N; ZN: For the rest of our analysis we will assume that Z is the ￿nite
It can be used to model characteristics that are associated with economic, sociological,
cultural or other factors. Since the notion of ￿space￿ may be broadly interpreted, this
suggests that our methods can be used for the analysis of a wide range of problems.
4group of integers modulo N: This means that our group of characteristics,
whether spatial, social, or economic, can be represented by a discrete ring
of cells with the property that ￿ cell 0￿is the same as ￿ cell N￿ , ￿ cell 1￿is the
same as ￿ cell N + 1￿and so on.2
Our state and control functions can be identi￿ed with the abstract func-
tions x(t)(z) = x(t;￿); u(t)(z) = u(t;￿); which take values on Z and which
belong to the space of vector valued functions which are square integrable










2 dz < 1
￿
: (1)
We introduce into our system the real function v (t;z) which is also iden-
ti￿ed with the abstract function v (t)(z) = v (t;￿) that takes values in the
space of functions which are square integrable with respect to the Haar
measure This function describes a deterministic speci￿cation error which is
expressed in terms of deviations from a baseline or benchmark case which
is de￿ned for v (t;z) := 0. This speci￿cation error is distributed across the
domain Z according to v (t)(z); so that the error may vary across cells at
the same point in time. To express the idea that when the model is mis-
speci￿ed the benchmark model remains a good approximation, we restrain









where e￿￿t is the appropriate discount factor.
Each cell z 2 Z of the system is also subject to a stochastic force which
2This assumption simpli￿es considerably the technical aspects of our analysis without
any loss in the generality of results, since our analysis can be generalized to continuous
spaces. The assumption of ￿ ring of cells￿was used by Turing (1952) in the classic paper
on morphogenesis.
3The Haar measure is a variant of the Lebesgue measure suitable for ZN: The Haar
measure is invariant to the translation map z 7! z + z0 and the translation operation for
functions on Z de￿ned as (Tz0f)(z) := f (z ￿ z0): An operator A with domain D (A) in
the space of square integrable functions with respect to the Haar measure is said to be
translation invariant if for all z 2 Z
Tz : D (A) ! D (A) and ATzf = TzAf 8f 2 D (A) (Bamieh et al. 2003, p. 1023).
As we will see later, translation invariance is very useful for providing tractability to the
models developed in this paper, without introducing unrealistic characteristics.
4When we write the integral with respect to dz we interpret it as a sum over z 2 ZN:
In the rest of the paper we use integral signs and sums interchangeably.
5is represented by a white noise _ B(t)(z) which is the formal time-derivative
of a Wiener process B(t)(z) which is placed in each cell z:
Thus in our model the coordinates of the characteristics (spatial, social,
or economics) denoted by z vary in the group Z; and the functions related to
state, control and misspeci￿cation functions as well as the stochastic force
are fully distributed over this coordinate.
E⁄ects across the z coordinate, for example spatial e⁄ects, on the state
of the system are modelled in terms of local and long-range or nonlocal
e⁄ects. Nonlocal e⁄ects describing the impact of the concentration of the











= X (t;z): (3)
Local e⁄ects are modeled by classic di⁄usion. Interpreting partial derivatives
with respect to z as ￿nite di⁄erences when working on ZN; local e⁄ects are
represented by the term
Ed (t;z) = D[x(t;z + 1) ￿ 2x(t;z) + x(t;z ￿ 1)]; (4)
where D > 0 is the di⁄usion coe¢ cient.5
When e⁄ects are non-local the degree of interconnectedness can be repre-

















where ￿1 and ￿2 are level and shape parameters. For example, as ￿2 de-
creases, the kernel increases and becomes "￿ atter" at the same time, suggest-
ing that interconnectedness increases. For local e⁄ects, interconnectedness
is related to the di⁄usion coe¢ cient D: The higher D is, the faster the state
variable moves from cells of high concentration to cells of low concentration.
The interconnectedness in our system is also re￿ ected in nonlocal control
5When Z is continuous then local e⁄ects are modeled by Ec (t;z) = D
@2x(t;z)
@z2 .










= U (t;z): (6)
These e⁄ects describe the impact of the control applied in cell z0 on the
control of the system u(t;z) in cell z:
The stochastic shocks in each cell can also be correlated across cells. In











All the kernel functions, such Kj (￿); j = x;u; used in this paper are
assumed to be continuous and symmetric around zero in Z; or Kj (z) =
Kj (￿z). Given the above assumptions, the evolution of the system￿ s state
can described in continuous time domain by by a general equation of motion:
@x(t;z)
@t
= f (x(t;z);u(t;z);(Kx)(t;z);(Ku)(t;z);v (t;z))
+Ed (t;z) + (KdB)(t;z); x(0;z) = x0 (z): (8)
In a discrete time domain t = 0;1;2;:::; the evolution of the system is de-
scribed as
xt+1 (z) = f (xt (z);ut (z);Xt (z);Ut (z);vt+1 (z))
+Edt (z) + "t+1 (z); z = 1;:::;N: (9)
The state dynamics (8) or (9) coupled with a payo⁄ functional can be
used to extend the robust control analytical framework developed by Hansen
and Sargent (2008) to distributed parameter systems. When the regulator
has concerns about model misspeci￿cation, the regulator￿ s objective can be
expressed in terms of the following penalty distributed parameter robust















subject to (8) (10)
7where










dz0 = (K0x)(t;z) (11)










dz0 = (K0u)(t;z) (12)
represent nonlocal e⁄ects in the payo⁄ functional which are modelled using
the kernel formulation. In the extremization problem6 (10), the minimizing
agent ￿Nature ￿chooses a v while ￿ 2 (￿;+1]; ￿ > 0 is a penalty parameter
restraining the minimizing choice of the v (t;z) function. The lower bound
￿ is a so-called breakdown point beyond which it is fruitless to seek more
robustness because the minimizing agent is su¢ ciently unconstrained so that
she/he can push the criterion function to ￿1 despite the best response of
the maximizing agent. Thus when ￿ < ￿; robust control rules cannot be
attained. The benchmark distributed parameter optimal control problem is
a special case of (10) for v (t;z) ￿ 0; while when (KdB)(t;z) ￿ 0 in addition,
we have a deterministic distributed parameter control problem.
Problem (10) can be regarded as a starting point for de￿ning a robust-
distributed parameter linear quadratic regulator problem. This problem,
which as far as we know has not been studied before in economics, can be
used to provide new insights into the regulation of various applied problems
when the regulator has concerns about model misspeci￿cation, the state
function evolves in time and space and local and nonlocal spatial e⁄ects are
present.
A special case of an optimal solution for problem (10), provided it
exists, is the optimal solution of the spatially independent deterministic
benchmark problem. This problem is de￿ned for v (t;z) ￿ 0; D = 0;
x(t;z) = x(t);u(t;z) = u(t): Spatial independence means that the ker-
nel operators can be written as (￿￿)(t;z) = ￿(t)
P
z02Z ’(z ￿ z0); where
P






: We shall call a locally optimal steady state of the spa-
tially independent deterministic benchmark problem denoted by (￿ x￿; ￿ u￿;0)
a ￿ at optimal steady state (FOSS) since this steady state will exhibit a
spatially uniform distribution for the state-costate and control variables as-
sociated with the problem. In Appendix 1 we show that the correct linear
6We follow Hansen and Sargent in using the term extremization for the supinf opera-
tion.
8quadratic approximation of the robust distributed parameter problem (10)



















= Ax + Bu + ￿ AX + ￿ BU + Cv + Ed (14)
x(0;z) = x0 (z);x(t;0) = x(t:N);8t (15)
￿ = (x;u;X0;U0;X;U);
￿
A;B; ￿ A; ￿ B;C
￿
: ￿xed parameters (16)
where, by a slight abuse of notation, (x;u;v) denote deviations from the
deterministic FOSS: In (13) Q = [qij];i;j = 1;:::;6 is a (6 ￿ 6) symmetric
matrix of the second derivatives, in the FrØchet sense, of the Hamiltonian of
the spatially independent deterministic benchmark problem evaluated at the
FOSS and
￿







v) with all FrØchet derivatives
evaluated at the FOSS (see Appendix 1 for details).
















xt+1 = Axt + But + ￿ AXt + ￿ BUt + Cvt+1 + Edt: (18)
Problem (13) is a linear quadratic problem. We can think of this problem
as the problem of a linear quadratic regulator, or as a linear quadratic
approximation of a more general nonlinear penalty distributed parameter
robust control problem.7
7Note that the expectation operator is missing from the linear quadratic approxima-
tions (13) or (17). This is because, as we explain in detail in section 3, a certainty
equivalence principle holds which is related to the Hansen and Sargent result (2008, Sec-
tion 2.4.1). This principle states that the controls are the same for the deterministic and
the stochastic version of the linear quadratic approximation, or equivalently the controls
are the same whether or not the stochastic term is included in (14) or (18). In our paper
this principle is slightly di⁄erent from the one of Hansen and Sargent because we don￿ t
multiply the shocks, if they were to be included in (14) or (18), by the same matrix C
that multiplies the adversarial agent￿ s control, v (t) or vt+1.
93 Robust linear-quadratic regulation and hot spots
Problem (13) is de￿ned in the in￿nite dimensional space of functions which
are square integrable with respect to the Haar measure. The analysis of this
problem can be greatly simpli￿ed by exploiting the property of the objective
functional and the dynamics of problem (13) to be translation invariant with
respect to the coordinate z. This property allows us to decompose, using
Fourier transforms, the in￿nite dimensional optimal control problem to a set
of ￿nite dimensional optimal control problems (Bamieh et al. 2002). The
Fourier transform F associates a function   (￿) on the set Z with a function
^   (!) on the set ^ Z which is called the dual or the character group. In our
case the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) (e.g., Chu 2008) of a function
  (t)(z) =   (t;￿) =   (t;z); z 2 Z is de￿ned as:





  (t;z)e￿2￿i! z
N ; ! 2 ^ Z: (19)
When Z = ZN then ^ Z = ZN as well, thus the Fourier transform F will map
functions on ZN to functions also on ZN: The inverse Fourier transform is
  (t;z) :=
N￿1 X
!=0
^   (t;!)e2￿i! z
N ; z 2 ZN: (20)
The properties of the Fourier transform imply that translation invariant
operators in Z are associated with multiplication operators in ^ Z: Since our
kernel operators are translation invariant we have, using the convolution
theorem for the DFT:
F(Kj￿)(t;!) = ( d Kj￿)(t;!) = ^ Kj (!) ^ ￿(t;!) (21)
j = x;u;"; ￿ = (x;u;dB): (22)
Thus the use of DFT allows us to transform nonlocal e⁄ects (spatial or
economic) expressed by kernels into simpler multiplicative expressions in
ZN. Local e⁄ects can also be simpli￿ed by using the shift theorem of the
DFT, which implies that:
Fx(t)(! ￿ k) = e￿2￿ik !
N ^ x(t;!): (23)
10Using the shift theorem the DFT of the local e⁄ect term becomes:




























using in the second and third line the trigonometric identities
exp(i￿) = cos(￿) + isin(￿); exp(￿i￿) = cos(￿) ￿ isin(￿) (27)
2sin2 (￿) = 1 ￿ cos(2￿): (28)
Taking the DFT of the linearization of (8), we obtain:8
d^ x(t;!)
dt
= A^ x(t;!) + B^ u(t;!) + ￿ A ^ Kx (!) ^ x(t;!) + ￿ B ^ Ku^ u(t;!)

















B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!)
￿
^ u(t;!)
+C^ v (t;!) + ^ K" (!)d ^ B(t;!) ; ^ x(0;!) = ^ x0 (!): (29)
The Plancherel theorem implies that the quadratic objective functional


































^ w0 = (^ x(t;!); ^ u(t;!))
0 ; ^ Q = [^ qij (!)] i;j = 1;2; (32)
where the elements of matrix ^ Q are de￿ned in the dual space ^ Z; or the
frequency domain, and depend on the spatial kernels. In Appendix 2 we
show how to derive the quadratic form ^ w0 ^ Q ^ w. Then the linear quadratic
approximation of robust distributed parameter problem (10) is equivalent
to the extremization of (31) subject to (29). In the same way the discrete
8We assume that the Wiener processes are the same at equidistant points around the
circle so that the output of the Fourier transform is real.



















^ w0 = (^ xt (!); ^ ut (!))
0 ; ^ Q = [^ qij (!)] i;j = 1;2 (34)






+ ￿ A ^ Kx (!)
i
^ xt (!) + (35)
￿
B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!)
￿
^ ut (!) + C^ vt+1 (!) + ^ K" (!)^ "t+1 (!): (36)
The robust linear quadratic regulator problem (31) and (29) with initial
conditions ^ x(0;!) = ^ x0 (!) is "block-diagonal" with blocks parametrized by
!: That is, for a ￿xed ! problem (31) and (29) is a ￿nite dimensional linear-
quadratic penalty robust control problem of the type studied by Hansen
and Sargent (2008). We can use problem (31) and (29) or the equivalent
problem (33)-(35) to characterize the emergence of a spatial hot spot. We
use the continuous time model to characterize hot spots, but results can
easily be extended to the discrete time model. Under appropriate regularity
assumptions (Hansen et al. 2006), the fsup;infg operators can be replaced
with fmax;ming: Furthermore the order in which the maximizing agent and
the minimizing agent choose does not matter (Hansen and Sargent 2008,
Chapter 7, Section 7.7).
Recalling that Fourier transformation diagonalizes the coupled matrix
Bellman equation in z-space into N separate scalar Bellman equations, one
for each ! 2 ^ ZN; and suppressing ! to simplify notation, the Bellman-Isaacs
equation for the linear quadratic problem (31) and (29) can be written as
the scalar equation below:








M^ x2 + N^ u2 + 2S^ x^ u+￿^ v2￿
+ (37)






M (!) = ^ q11 (!); N (!) = ^ q22 (!) ; S (!) = ^ q12 (!)
M < 0;N < 0;MN ￿ S2 > 0;8! for strict concavity




+ ￿ A ^ Kx (!);G = B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!)
where ￿P ^ x2 (!) ￿ p = V (^ x(!)) is the value function for the problem with
P;p parameters to be determined. Following standard approaches we solve
12for the minimization problem ￿rst to obtain




Substituting into the Bellman-Isaacs equation, the maximization prob-
lem is




























Substituting into (39) and equating factors of like power, we obtain that

























+ ￿ A ^ Kx (!);G = B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!):
The roots of the quadratic will depend on (￿;!): If P￿ (￿;!) = P￿ is a






Note from (41) that since p￿ does not depend on the volatility parameter
K"; the optimal decision rule (40) does not depend on K": Thus the modi￿ed
certainty equivalence principle related to Hansen and Sargent (2008), which
was mentioned above, holds for the distributed parameters linear quadratic
regulator problem in the sense that the same decision rules for ^ u(!) and ^ v (!)
emerge from solving a random version of the appropriate Bellman equation
or from a nonstochastic version where d ^ B(t;!) ￿ 0: However the optimal
decision rules depend on the misspeci￿cation parameter C as long as ￿ < 1:
Using this certainty equivalence property, we focus on the nonstochastic
13version of the problem to de￿ne hot spots in the space of ￿ cells￿ZN. Hot
spots are determined by the interaction of the penalty parameter ￿ with
! 2 ZN: We will characterize a hot spot ! in terms of stability of the state
variable in the neighborhood of the FOSS and in terms of low values for
welfare re￿ ected in the value function of the problem.
3.1 Hot spot of type 1: The agglomeration hot spot






> 0 by the concavity of the objective.
Furthermore the stationary point for (41) will be at P+ = ￿￿1=2￿2; while
the extremum (maximum or minimum) of ￿(P) will be ￿(P+) We can then
distinguish the following cases:
1. C2
￿ + G2
N < 0 for ￿ < 1: In this case ￿(P+) is a maximum and
￿(P) = 0 has one positive root P￿ (￿;!).9
2. C2
￿ +G2
N > 0 for ￿ < 1: In this case ￿(P+) is a minimum and ￿(P) = 0
could have: two positive roots, two negative roots, one positive or one
negative root, or no real roots. Furthermore, if:
(a) ￿(P+) > 0; there are no real roots.
(b) ￿(P+) < 0 and ￿0 (0) < 0; there are two positive roots P￿
1;2 (￿;!)
or one (double) positive root.
(c) ￿(P+) < 0 and ￿0 (0) > 0; there are two negative roots P￿
1;2 (￿;!)
or one (double) negative root.
We will assume for the rest of this subsection that ￿(P) = 0 has one
positive root P￿ (￿;!): Then when optimal decision rules are followed, the























= ￿(!;￿) ^ x(t;!) ; ^ x(0;!) = ^ x0 (!): (44)
9Note that when ￿ ! 1 there are no concerns for misspeci￿cation and the regulator
trusts the benchmark model.
14The solution of (44) in the dual group is ^ x(t;!) = A!e￿(!)t; where ^ x(t;!)
is de￿ned as ^ x(t;!) = ^ x(!;t)￿ ^ x￿ (!) by the linearity of the Fourier trans-
form,with ^ x￿ (!) being the Fourier transform of the FOSS. Then A! =
^ x(0;!) ￿ ￿ x￿ where ￿ x￿ is the FOSS and ^ x(0;!) is the Fourier transform of
initial conditions in the neighborhood of the FOSS for all z:10
Using the inverse Fourier transform, the solution for the state variable
in the primary group is









; z 2 ZN; (45)
The evolution of the state variable (45) is very similar to Turing￿ s (1952)
formulation regarding morphogenesis associated with chemical substances,
although it is derived, in contrast to Turing, from a problem that involves
optimization. The part of the exponential ￿(!;￿) determines the potential
instability emerging at frequency or mode !: If, for some combination of
(!;￿); the quantity ￿(!;￿) > 0; a wave pattern which becomes more pro-
found with the passage of time emerges. In this case a spatial instability
occurs at (!;￿) and agglomeration emerges. In more recent terminology
(Murray 2003), ￿(!) is a dispersion relationship (see, for example, Brock
and Xepapadeas 2008, 2010). A frequency or mode ^ ! will be unstable if
￿(^ !;￿) > 0: In this case an optimal agglomeration emerges on the ring.
The interesting result, which is di⁄erent from previous results on optimal-
di⁄usion-induced or optimal-spillover-induced spatial instability (Brock and
Xepapadeas 2008, 2009, 2010), is that instability can be induced by a ￿ < 1;
while the same instability would not emerge for ￿ ! 1: Thus the following
proposition can be stated.
Proposition 1 Assume that when ￿ ! 1; ￿(!;￿) < 0 for all ! and assume
that there exists a critical pair (!￿;￿￿
1) with ￿￿
1 < 1 : ￿(!￿;￿￿
1) > 0: Then
optimal robustness induced instability emerges on the ring of cells ZN:
This result suggests the regulator￿ s concerns for model misspeci￿cation
could induce spatial agglomeration on the ring. This means that the optimal
10^ x


















￿ = ^ S (!) ￿ x
￿;! = 0;1;:::;N ￿ 1:
But ^ S (0) = 1 and ^ S (!) = 0 for ! = 1;:::;N￿1; since e
￿2i!￿ = cos(2￿!)￿isin(2￿!) = 1;
for ! = 1;:::;N ￿ 1: Thus ^ x
￿ (!) = ￿ x
￿:
15robust feedback control which will be of the form












; z 2 ZN (46)
will also exhibit a wave pattern around the ring. In this case the regula-
tor￿ s concerns about model misspeci￿cation induce controls which will break
spatial symmetry and produce agglomeration.
3.2 Hot spot of type 2: The breakdown hot spot
From (41) let P￿ (￿;!) = P￿ (￿)(!) = P￿ (￿;￿) be the largest root of the
quadratic as a function of ￿ for each ! 2 ZN: Consider the non-empty sets,
assuming they exist, de￿ned as
￿(!) = f￿ : P￿ (￿)(!) < 0g: (47)
Assume that for some !; P￿ (￿) < 0 for a critical ￿c 2 ￿ ￿! ￿ (0;+1);
where ￿ ￿! is a closed set. Then for this ! and ￿ 2 ￿ ￿!; the maximizing agent
cannot prevent the minimizing agent from driving the maximizing agent￿ s
objective to ￿1: Let ￿ ￿! be the maximum ￿ 2 ￿ ￿!; and consider the set of
all the maximum ￿s for each ! de￿ned as
￿max
! (!) =
￿￿ ￿! : P￿ ￿￿ ￿!
￿
< 0;￿ ￿! = max ￿ ￿!
￿
: (48)
We de￿ne as a hot spot of type 2 a mode !2 for which
!2 : ￿ ￿!2 = max￿max
! (!): (49)
If we associate the case of ￿ ! 1 with no concern for model misspeci￿cation
and con￿dence in the benchmark model, and then interpret reductions in ￿
as an increase of concern for model misspeci￿cation or lack of con￿dence in
the benchmark model, then a hot spot of type 2 can be given the following
interpretation. When ￿ ￿!2 is su¢ ciently far from zero, then at mode !2; the
regulator cannot optimize and cannot prevent her welfare from going to ￿1
even though her concerns for misspeci￿cation are not very large in the sense
of a ￿ close to zero. It should be noted that if all sets (47) are empty, then
hot spots of type 2 do not exist.
16To provide a concrete example, assume that S = 0 by a suitable rede￿n-
ition of variables (Brock and Malliaris 1989, chapter 5), and that ^ K0
x (!) =
^ K0
u (!) = D = 0; so that we have only nonlocal e⁄ects in the state dynamics.
A critical value of ￿ is de￿ned from (41) as
￿c :=
￿NC2
G2 ;N < 0;G = B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!): (50)
For ￿ = ￿c we have that P￿ (!) =
M=2
2F￿￿ where F = A + ^ Kx (!) > 0 and
M = q11 < 0: Then P￿ (!) < 0 for a small discount rate. A hot spot of type
2 will be a mode !2 such that:
￿ ￿!2 = max￿max




B + ￿ B ^ Ku (!)
￿2: (51)
It should be noted that the critical ￿c is larger the lower the e⁄ectiveness of
the control, measured by G2; the higher the cost of the control, measured
by N; and the stronger the impact of misspeci￿cation on the state dynamics
and the e⁄ectiveness of the adversarial agent (Nature), measured by C2:
Since by the Plancherel theorem the total value of the regulator￿ s objec-
tive is the sum of the values for all modes, the existence of a type 2 hot spot
will drive the total value to ￿1 and will render regulation useless. If this
hot spot does not arise at the spatially homogenous system de￿ned for D =
0 and for
￿
^ Kx (!); ^ Kh (!)
￿
￿xed numbers independent of !; then our re-
sults suggest that spatial e⁄ects and moderate concerns about model mis-
speci￿cation might cause regulation to break down. As we will discuss in
the application section, this breakdown might suggest the need to introduce
additional regulatory instruments.
3.3 Hot spot of type 3: The cost of robustness
However, even if we obtain a positive root P￿ (￿;!) for all !; another type of
hot spot could emerge. Since the value function can be written as V (x) =
￿P￿x2; due to the certainty equivalence, then for a given initial state a large
P￿ corresponds to low welfare and large cost, while a small P￿ corresponds
to higher welfare and smaller cost. Thus if P￿ ! 1 then welfare goes to
￿1 and cost goes to +1:
Let P￿ (￿;!) > 0: For each ! let ￿￿
c be the critical value of ￿ for which
17P￿ (￿￿
c;!) = max P￿ (￿;!); for all ￿ 2 (0;+1): A hot spot of type 3 will
be a mode !2 such that:




c;!) for all ! 2 ZN: (52)
Since P￿ (￿￿
c;!3) > 0 the regulator can prevent the minimizing agent from
driving her objective to ￿1; but the regulator will experience low welfare at
this point. If ￿P￿ (￿￿
c;!3)x2 < ￿P￿ (1;!)x2; then concerns for misspec-
i￿cation reduce the value of the regulator and the largest value reduction
occurs at the hot spot !3: The di⁄erence
￿
￿P￿ (￿￿
c;!3)x2 ￿ P￿ (1;!)x2￿
￿ will
provide a measure of the cost of seeking robustness. Since sometimes ro-
bust preferences have been associated with a precautionary principle, this
robustness cost can be regarded as an indication of the cost of following
precautionary policies.
4 Application: Distributed robust control of a com-
mercial ￿shery
We illustrate our theory by extending Smith￿ s (1969) well known model of
commercial ￿shing to spatial robustness. We believe that this extension is a
new and potentially useful contribution to our paper. We assume that the
area of the ￿shery consists of a ring of N cells so that our space Z is the
￿nite group of integers modulo N;ZN: Let x(t;z) denote biomass at time
t and cell z 2 Z: Fish biomass moves from cell to cell. The movements are
short range or local movements which can be described by classic di⁄usion
with di⁄usion coe¢ cient D > 0; which means that ￿sh move from cells of
high biomass concentration to adjacent cells of low biomass concentration.
Let V (t;z) denote the number of identical vessels or ￿rms operating at cell
z of the ring, and h(t;z) the harvest rate at cell z per unit time. Thus total




= f (x(t;z)) + Ed (t;z) ￿ V (t;z)h(t;z); (53)
x(0;z) = x0 (z)
Ed (t;z) = D[x(t;z + 1) ￿ 2x(t;z) + x(t;z ￿ 1)]; (54)
18where f (x) is the recruitment rate or growth function for the ￿shery, with
f (x) = f (￿ x) = 0;f0 ￿
x0￿
= 0;f00 (x) < 0;x ￿ 0;0 ￿ x < x0 < ￿ x: When
f (x) is quadratic, growth is logistic. Harvested ￿sh is sold at an exoge-
nous world price p: The cost per vessel for harvesting rate h is de￿ned
as C (h(t;z);x(t;z);X (t;z);H (t;z)): X (t;z) = (KXV )(t;z); H (t;z) =
(Khh)(t;z) denote nonlocal e⁄ects modelled by kernels as de￿ned in sec-
tion 2. For the cost function we assume, denoting partial derivatives with
subscripts, that: (i) Ch > 0; Chh ￿ 0; (ii) Cx < 0; which implies resource
stock externalities;(iii) CX > 0; which implies crowding externalities due to
congestion e⁄ects. We assume that an increase in vessels in a given cell will
always increase costs, that is CV > 0: The kernel formulation in the cost
function means that vessels not only in cell z but also near cell z could cre-
ate congestion e⁄ects and increase operating costs of the vessels operating in
cell z; and (iv) CH < 0; which implies knowledge or productivity external-
ities because harvesting that takes place near cell z helps the development
of harvesting knowledge in z and reduces operating costs. Pro￿t per vessel
at z is de￿ned as ￿ (t;z) = ph(t;z) ￿ C (h(t;z);x(t;z);X (t;z);H (t;z)):
Vessels are attracted to cell z if pro￿ts per vessel are positive in this cell.
Vessels can be attracted to the ring from locations outside the ring if pro￿ts
are positive in cells of the ring, so the number of vessels in the ring does not
need to be conserved.11 Thus the evolution of the vessels is described by:
@V (t;z)
@t
= ￿[ph(t;z) ￿ C (h(t;z);x(t;z);X (t;z);H (t;z))] (55)
￿ > 0;V (0;z) = V0 (z);
where ￿ measures speed of adjustment and is set equal to one without loss of
generality. A regulator is trying to determine an optimal level of harvesting
per vessel in each cell. This harvesting level can be used, for example, to
set up a quota system in each cell of the ring. The regulator￿ s objective
is the maximization of discounted pro￿ts over the whole ring by taking
into account biomass di⁄usion as well as stock, congestion and knowledge
11To simplify we ignore transportation costs.











The regulator however has concerns regarding the speci￿cation of biomass
dynamics in each cell. These concerns are captured by a deterministic spec-
i￿cation error which is expressed in terms of deviations from the benchmark
case which is de￿ned for v (t;z) := 0. The speci￿cation error is distributed
across the domain Z according to v (t)(z); so that the error may vary across
cells at the same point in time. This assumption means that, depending on
her scienti￿c knowledge, the regulator might trust the benchmark model
more or less depending on the cell. For a large enough ring, this assump-
tion ￿which implies spatially di⁄erentiated degrees of scienti￿c uncertainty
￿seems plausible. When the model is misspeci￿ed, the benchmark model
remains a good approximation so the misspeci￿cation error satis￿es (2).
Each cell of the ￿shery is also subject to a stochastic force represented by a
Wiener process which is placed in each cell as described in section 2. Under




= f (x(t;z))+Ed (t;z)￿V (t;z)h(t;z)+Cv (t;z)+(KdB)(t;z):
(57)
The regulator￿ s concerns about model misspeci￿cation are incorporated
into robust preferences. Thus the regulator decides about optimal harvest-
ing per vessel in each cell, by solving a problem where Nature will play the
role of the minimizing or ￿ mean￿agent. In this context the regulator consid-
ers that Nature ￿ chooses￿a misspeci￿cation error to minimize the regulator￿ s
objective and, by doing so, Nature determines lower bounds to the perfor-
mance of the regulation. If the lower bound tends to ￿1; then regulation is
useless. The problem of the regulator is therefore the distributed parameter
robust control problem with local and nonlocal spatial e⁄ects of the type
12To simplify the interpretation of results and the analysis, we do not include existence
values for the biomass.
20described in sections 2 and 3, which can be written, dropping (t;z) in some















subject to (55), (57). (59)
Let
￿
￿ x￿; ￿ V ￿;￿ h￿;0; ￿ ￿
￿; ￿ ￿￿￿
be a FOSS for the spatially independent deter-
ministic benchmark model as de￿ned in section 3 and appendix 1, with (￿;￿)
the costate variables associated with the spatially independent deterministic
benchmark dynamics corresponding to (55), (57) respectively. Assume that
this FOSS has the local saddle point property. Linear quadratic approx-
imation, application of the discrete Fourier transform and the Plancherel
theorem, and use of the certainty equivalence property as described in sec-
tion 3, allow us to write the linear quadratic approximation of problem (58)
around the FOSS as a set of countable ￿nite dimensional linear quadratic
problems, one problem for each ! in the dual space ZN: The regulator￿ s
objective now is to determine an optimal harvesting rule that takes into



















^ x(t;!); ^ V (t;!);^ h(t;!)
￿0
; ^ Q = [^ qij (!)] i;j = 1;2;3 (61)
d^ x(t;!)
dt
= A1^ x(t;!) + A2^ V (t;!) + A3^ h(t;!) + (62)
C^ v (t;!) ; ^ x(0;!) = ^ x0 (!) (63)
d^ V (t;!)
dt



















H ^ Kh (!)
￿
(66)
where (￿) when associated with partial derivatives indicates derivative eval-
uated at the FOSS, matrix ^ Q is negative de￿nite and its elements ^ qij (!)
can be calculated using the procedure described in appendix 2. Note that
the coe¢ cients of the transition equations depend on local and nonlocal spa-
tial e⁄ects in the frequency domain. Assuming a quadratic value function
21W
￿
^ x(!;￿); ^ V (!;￿)
￿
= ￿P1x2￿P2V 2￿P3xV and following the procedure
of section 3, we obtain the optimal feedback controls as:
^ v￿ (!;￿) =
C
￿
2P1^ x(!;￿) + P3^ V (!;￿)
￿
￿




(2P1A3 + P3B2 ￿ ^ q31) ^ x(!;￿) + (2P2B2 + P3A3 ￿ ^ q32) ^ V (!;￿)
i
:
Substituting the optimal feedback controls into the value functions and
equating coe¢ cients of the same power, the parameters of the value function
































1 = 0: (69)
We note the following: When the regulator is not concerned about model
misspeci￿cation, then ￿ ! 1 and our problem is a distributed parameter
control problem. Local spatial e⁄ects are captured by the term 4Dsin2 ￿￿!
N
￿
which re￿ ects biomass di⁄usion, while nonlocal e⁄ects are captured by the
terms
￿
^ Kx (!); ^ Kh (!)
￿
which re￿ ect congestion and knowledge e⁄ects.
When spatial e⁄ects are not present and ￿ ! 1; then our problem is a
standard linear quadratic regulator problem. A solution of (67)-(69) will
provide the parameters of the value function in the frequency domain as
functions of ￿ and the local and the nonlocal spatial e⁄ects, or
P￿
i (!) = P￿
i
￿
!;￿;D; ^ Kx (!); ^ Kh (!)
￿
: (70)
This solution can be used to locate su¢ cient conditions for hot spots of type
1-3 discussed above.
4.1 Agglomeration hot spot (type 1)







0 so that the value function is concave. Then the state dynamics when
13The full system is presented in appendix 3.
22the maximizing agent (regulator) and the minimizing agent (Nature) make























3B2 ￿ ^ q31) (72)
































3A3 ￿ ^ q32): (75)
For stability of the FOSS in all frequencies ! 2 ZN we need the two
eigenvalues of matrix A denoted by (￿1;￿2) to be real and negative or to
have negative real parts for all ￿: Let ￿1 denote the largest eigenvalue of
matrix A: Then the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 2 (i) If ￿1 > 0 for a set of frequencies ￿ 2 ZN when ￿ ! 1
then an agglomeration hot spot exists for frequencies or modes ! 2 ￿; where
￿ can be a singleton. The agglomeration hot spot is independent of concerns
for model misspeci￿cation. (ii) If ￿1 > 0 for a set of frequencies ￿ 2 ZN




; with ￿ ￿ < 1; then an agglomeration hot spot is
induced by the regulator￿ s concerns about model misspeci￿cation.
An agglomeration hot spot in this context means that optimal regula-
tion implies the generation of a heterogenous spatial pattern of ￿sh biomass
and ￿shing vessels along the ring, with the form of a wave pattern. These
patterns will be realized in the primal space ZN when inverse Fourier trans-
forms similar to (45) are applied. Furthermore, optimal harvesting, since it
is a feedback function of ￿sh biomass and vessels, is also going to exhibit
a similar wave heterogenous spatial pattern. Thus if quotas are to be is-
sued, the amount of quotas will be di⁄erent for each cell of the ring and
the approximate optimal spatiotemporal quota path will be fh￿ (t;z)g
Z=N
z=1 :
Suppose that h￿ (t;z1) < h￿ (t;z2), then if quotas can be traded across cells,
the optimal trading ratio will be h￿ (t;z1)=h￿ (t;z2) for quotas of cell 2 to be
23used for harvesting in cell 1. The importance of part (ii) of proposition 2 is
that the spatially heterogeneous quota pattern can be induced by concerns
about model misspeci￿cation, since reduction of ￿ means increase in the reg-
ulator￿ s concerns about model misspeci￿cation. To put it in more general
terms, when concerns about possible misspeci￿cations of state dynamics dif-
fer across sites, then the regulator might introduce spatially di⁄erentiated
instruments and generate agglomerations.
When it is optimal to generate agglomeration through the mechanism
described above, the question of what will be the ￿nal ￿or the steady state
equilibrium ￿agglomeration, which is the spatial pattern of vessels and ￿sh
biomass after a long lapse of time, arises. Emergence of agglomeration im-
plies that the spatial instability will tend to become ￿ catastrophic￿in the
sense that the amplitude of the waves increase with time. This pattern will
be halted, however, when the ￿sh biomass in some cells becomes zero. This
is because in the dynamic system of ￿sh biomass and vessels (57), (55), bio-
mass acts as an activator, since an increase in biomass in a cell will reduce
costs and increase the rate of growth of vessels in this cell, while vessels act
as an inhibitor, since an increase in the number of vessels in a cell will reduce
the rate of growth of biomass in this cell. Thus when biomass collapses in
a cell, cost per vessel will become very high, pro￿ts per vessel will become
negative and number of vessels in this cell will eventually decline to zero.
Whether biomass di⁄usion will increase the stock of ￿sh in the cell to the
extent that vessels will be attracted depends on the speci￿c structure of the
￿shery, but this is a possibility suggesting that quite complex spatiotem-
poral patterns might emerge in the long run. Although the analysis of the
equilibrium spatial distribution of biomass, vessels and quotas is beyond the
purpose of the present paper, it can be approximated by substituting the
optimal harvesting rule fh￿ (t;z)g
Z=N
z=1 in feedback form into the system of
(57), (55) and then solving the system with (@x=@t) = (@V=@t) = 0: This
will be a system of di⁄erence equations in the spatial dimension with circle
boundary conditions. In principle numerical schemes can be used to provide
a description of equilibrium distributions.
244.2 Break down hot spot (type 2)
Consider the non-empty sets, assuming they exist, de￿ned as
￿(!) = f￿ : all P￿
i (￿) 2 R;i = 1;2;3 which are solutions of (67) ￿ (69)
imply a convex value function W
￿
^ x(!;￿); ^ V (!;￿)
￿o
: (76)
These sets represent ￿0s at which the value function is convex. A mode !2
will be a hot spot of type 2 if the value function becomes convex at this mode
for the largest ￿ < 1: If such a hot spot exists, the regulator cannot prevent
her value from going to ￿1 at this mode which means that she cannot pre-
vent the performance of the regulation by a quota system from reaching ￿1.
Since by the Plancherel theorem the total value of the regulator￿ s objective
is the sum of the values for all modes, the existence of a break down hot spot
will drive the total value to ￿1 and will render regulation useless. If this
hot spot does not arise at the spatially homogenous system de￿ned for D =
0 and
￿
^ Kx (!); ^ Kh (!)
￿
independent of !; then our results suggest that spa-
tial e⁄ects and moderate concerns about model misspeci￿cation might cause
regulation to break down. Although the complexity of the model does not
allow analytical results, numerical simulation might be possible to reveal
the relative contribution of local and nonlocal spatial e⁄ects to this break
down. Identi￿cation of this contribution might be important for re￿ning
regulation. If, for example, nonlocal congestion e⁄ects are responsible for
the emergence of this hot spot, then new regulatory instruments, such as
entry licences to a cell, could be introduced to prevent these e⁄ects from
creating the hot spot.
4.3 The cost of robustness hot spot (type 3)
A type 3 hot spot is consistent with a concave value function but corresponds
to a mode ! and a parameter ￿ at which the value function has the smallest




















a type 3 hot spot. At this hot spot regulation does not break down but the
largest reduction of value occurs. Since concerns about model misspeci￿ca-
tion have been associated with the concept of a precautionary principle, our
result can be used to characterize costs or bene￿ts from precaution. Since the
no concern case corresponds to the value function W
￿
^ x(!;1); ^ V (!;1)
￿
;
the cost or bene￿ts from precaution can be determined by
W
￿




^ x(!3;￿c); ^ V (!3;￿c)
￿
: (78)
As in the case of the break down hot spot discussed above, identi￿cation of
the relative contribution of local and nonlocal e⁄ects might be important for
re￿ning regulation and preventing large losses in value due to the application
of a precautionary principle.
5 Conclusions and suggestions for future research
This paper has developed robust control theory in spatial settings by build-
ing on recent work on distributed control of spatially invariant systems
(Bamieh et al. 2002; Curtain et al. 2008; Brock and Xepapadeas 2008, 2009,
2010) and on robust control in economics (Salmon 2002; JET 2006; Hansen
and Sargent 2008). By adapting and extending this work, we produced a
linear quadratic approximation to this problem (see Appendix 1). Using
that linear quadratic approximation, we were able to decompose an appar-
ently intractable in￿nite horizon robust control linear quadratic problem on
an in￿nite dimensional space with highly coupled spatial dynamics into a
countable number of tractable ￿nite dimensional in￿nite horizon robust con-
trol linear quadratic problems. Using these ￿nite dimensional problems, we
were able to characterize the robust solution for the original in￿nite dimen-
sional linear quadratic problem. As far as we know, this approach to spatial
robust control is new to economics. Our approach provides closed form so-
lutions to a wide class of spatial robust control problems in economics. Our
approach also leads to a useful precise formulation of three types of ￿hot
spots￿ .
Hot spots of type 1 are spatial agglomerations induced by concerns of the
optimizing agent about model misspeci￿cation. Here the penalty parameter
26￿ for choices of v(t;z) by the adversarial agent is still larger than any break-
down point ￿(!);! 2 ^ ZN and is still larger than any point where the value
function of the maximizing agent loses concavity in the maximizing agent￿ s
state variable. While the linear quadratic approach can signal the existence
of such hot spots, the accuracy of the linear quadratic approximation will
break down and underlying nonlinearities left out of the linear quadratic
approximation of the problem determine the ultimate patterns. This task
is beyond the scope of the current paper and is reserved for future research.
Hot spots of type 2 occur when the penalty parameter, ￿; for the adver-
sarial agent is lowered from +1 to the ￿￿rst￿value of ￿ where there is an
! where the adversarial agent can drive the maximizing agent￿ s welfare to
￿1. This kind of hot spot suggests a new type of precautionary principle
that operates when model uncertainty is present. Recall that the size of ￿ is
inversely related to the size of the model uncertainty set (e.g., Hansen and
Sargent 2008, chapter 2). Thus the optimizing agent will want to invest a lot
of resources in reducing model uncertainty that the regulator wishes to ro-
bustify against when type 2 hot spots exist. Hot spots of type 2 guide these
resources towards reduction of model uncertainty at the particular where
the hot spot exists. We plan to explore this type of precautionary principle
as well as to develop the ways in which to formulate the problem of optimal
allocation of model uncertainty reduction resources in spatial settings where
the concept of ￿space￿is much broader than physical space.
Hot spots of type 3 occur at !￿ s where the value function in the Fourier
domain computed from (37) and the text following (37), call it ^ W (^ x0 (!);!;￿),
is particularly low, i.e., when its absolute value is particularly large at a par-
ticular level of model uncertainty re￿ ected by a particular value of ￿. Again,
this type of hot spot reveals not only a strong incentive to employ resources
to learn more about the system in order to reduce model uncertainty, but
also directs allocation of those resources, much as indicated by hot spots of
type 2.
Last but not least, we apply our approach to a spatial extension of a clas-
sical work in environmental economics and bioeconomics, Vernon Smith￿ s
(1969) model of commercial ￿shing. We take the linear quadratic approx-
imation around a ￿ at optimal steady state where each site has an equal
number of vessels, using the material in the Appendix. We then study the
analytics of the solution and the three basic types of hot spots. We locate
27su¢ cient conditions for when it is optimal to induce agglomeration at some
sites independently of concerns about model misspeci￿cation. We also lo-
cate su¢ cient conditions under which concerns about model misspeci￿cation
and robusti￿cation against it lead to creation of ￿precautionary￿agglomer-
ations. This is a novel (to our knowledge) form of precautionary principle.
Of course a linear quadratic approach can only signal that the FOSS is
optimally (or robustly optimally) unstable. A study of the full nonlinear
problem is needed to assess whether agglomerations are actually created or
whether some other type of pattern is created. It is beyond the scope of the
current paper to conduct this study. This study would be the optimal control
analog of studies in mathematical biology and elsewhere of the actual non-
linear patterns created when the linearization approach signals instability.
In Brock and Xepapadeas (2008) and (2010), we used numerical methods to
compute the optimal aggregations when the linear quadratic approach sig-
naled instability of the FOSS. But we did not do robust control. It is beyond
the scope of the current paper to do an analog of the Brock and Xepapadeas
computational analysis for the robust control problems studied here. But
we conjecture that it will be a relatively straightforward adaptation of the
methods of Brock and Xepapadeas.
We placed the dynamics in this paper upon a ￿nite ring of cells, i.e., the
￿primary￿group ZN with modulo N arithmetic where Fourier transforms lie
in the ￿dual￿group ^ ZN = ZN. We did this to present the analytical results in
bold relief. We conjecture that the methods developed here can be extended
to many other pairs of primary and dual groups. We further conjecture that
the notation will become more complex but the basic methods will be the
same. See, for example, Bamieh et al. (2002, page 1092 and following
material, e.g. Table I) for the wide variety of settings that may be treated
in the context of spatially distributed control. This makes it clear that in
the context of spatially distributed control it will be basically a matter of
more complex notation, especially for two dimensional or higher dimensional
spaces. Hence, this is why we conjecture that the same will hold for robust
control. We leave this extension to future research.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Linear quadratic (LQ) approximation of nonlinear
distributed parameter penalty robust control problem
We extend the general approach set out by Magill (1977a,b) and we
28consider a general nonlinear distributed parameter penalty robust control
problem with deterministic misspeci￿cation only, since the modi￿ed cer-
tainty equivalence property will apply to the LQ problem. We will deal
with a general distributed parameter problem where space is continuous.
State and control functions can be identi￿ed with the abstract functions
x(t)(z) = x(t;￿); u(t)(z) = u(t;￿) which take values on Z and which be-
long to the space of vector valued functions which are square integrable
with respect to the Haar measure, while the deterministic misspeci￿cation
is again the real function v (t;z) which is identi￿ed with the abstract func-
tion v (t)(z) = v (t;￿) that takes values into the space of functions which
are square integrable with respect to the Haar measure. In deriving the
LQ approximation we use a continuous ￿nite space formulation with circle
boundary condition to simplify the exposition. Our results can be extended
















= f (x(t;z);u(t;z);(Kx)(t;z);(Ku)(t;z);v (t;z)) + (80)
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dz0 = ￿(t;z); j;￿ = x;u;￿ = X;U
Let
H(x;u;v;X0;U0;X;U;￿;D) = f0 (x;u;X0;U0)+￿v2+￿
￿





be the current value Hamiltonian for the distributed parameter penalty ro-
bust control problem (79), and assume that an optimal solution to this
problem exists with the maximizing and the minimizing agents taking si-
multaneous decisions. Let u￿ (t;z); v￿ (t;z) denote the optimal controls and
29x￿ (t;z); ￿￿ (t;z) denote the corresponding optimal state and costate paths
respectively.
A special case of this optimal solution is the optimal solution to the
spatially independent deterministic benchmark problem. This problem is a
special case of problem (79) for v (t;z) ￿ 0; D = 0; x(t;z) = x(t);u(t;z) =
u(t): Spatial independence means that the kernel operators can be written
as (￿￿)(t;z) = ￿(t)
R
z02Z ’(z ￿ z0)dz0; where
R
z02Z ’(z ￿ z0)dz0 = ￿ ’ is a







Thus at the spatially independent model, kernels are ￿xed parameters. The
current value Hamiltonian for this problem is simply:
H(x;￿;u) = f0 (x;u) + ￿f (x;u) (82)
where ￿(t) is the costate variable. From the maximum principle, the solution
of the problem is determined by the system
Hu(x;￿;u) = 0 (83)
Hx(x;￿;u) + _ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ = 0 (84)
H￿(x;￿;u) = 0: (85)
Let
￿
￿ x￿; ￿ u￿;0; ￿ ￿
￿￿
be a steady state of the spatially independent benchmark
model corresponding to paths that satisfy transversality conditions at in￿n-
ity. We shall call this steady state a ￿ at optimal steady state and we will
assume that the process described by (80) starts close to the FOSS, or that
x(0;z) starts close to x￿ for all z 2 Z:
Let
(￿;￿;￿;￿) = (86)
(x(t;z) ￿ x￿ (t;z);u(t;z) ￿ u￿ (t;z);v (t;z) ￿ v￿ (t;z);￿(t;z) ￿ ￿￿ (t;z))
denote deviations of the paths for the state, control and costate functions
from the optimal paths. Deviation should be understood as functions ￿(t)(z) =
￿(t;￿);￿ (t)(z) = ￿ (t;￿);￿ (t)(z) = ￿ (t;￿);￿ (t)(z) = ￿ (t;￿) which take val-
ues on Z and which belong to the space of vector valued functions which
are square integrable with respect to the Haar measure. A special case of
these deviations are deviations from the FOSS
￿
￿ x￿; ￿ u￿;0; ￿ ￿
￿￿
:
Perturb the optimal controls by letting
30u(t;z) = u￿ (t;z) + "￿ (t;z) (87)
v (t;z) = v￿ (t;z) + "￿ (t;z): (88)
For a control of the form (87), (88) we adapt Athans and Falb (1966,
page 261) to focus on perturbations of the state function of the form below,














! 0 as "2 ! 0 uni-
formly in (t;z): Athans and Falb (1966, pp. 254-265) show that control
perturbations of the form (87) lead to state perturbations of the form (89)
under appropriate regularity conditions for the case where Z is one point.
Substituting the perturbed state and controls into the kernel expressions
and using the linearity of the integral operator we obtain
(Kx)(t;z) = K
￿









(Ku)(t;z) = K(u￿ (t;z) + "￿ (t;z)) = (Ku￿)(t;z) + "(K￿)(t;z):(91)
We substitute perturbed control, state and kernels into (80) and then
expand it as a Taylor series around the FOSS
￿
￿ x￿; ￿ u￿;0; ￿ ￿
￿￿
; where the
expansion is de￿ned in terms of FrØchet derivatives of f (￿): Omitting (t;z)



































w0Ww + higher order terms, (92)
where ￿ Kx; ￿ Ku are the ￿xed, at the FOSS, kernels and w0Ww is the quadratic
form of the second order FrØchet derivatives of f (￿) with
w =
￿





￿ x￿; ￿ u￿; ￿ x￿ ￿ Kx; ￿ u￿ ￿ Ku;0
￿
= 0 since it is evaluated at the FOSS,






X (Ky) + f￿




Using the Hamiltonian function (81) write
H(x;u;v;X0;U0;X;U;￿￿) = G (x;u;v;X0;U0;X;U;￿￿) + ￿￿D
@x2
@z2 (95)
G (x;u;v;X0;U0;X;U;￿￿) = f0 (x;u;X0;U0) + ￿v2 + ￿￿f (x;u;X;U;v):


















with (t;z) omitted to ease notation. The performance functional along a
perturbed path, with perturbations given by (87), (88), (89), which is eval-















Let G0 = G (x￿;u￿;v￿;X￿
0;U￿
0;X￿;U￿;￿￿); then
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The terms ￿￿ @(x￿x￿)
@t and ￿￿D
@2(x￿x￿)
@z2 can be transformed as follows:
Integrating by parts the term
R 1
0 e￿￿t￿￿ @(x￿x￿)
@t dt and using appropriate
temporal transversality conditions, we obtain
Z 1
0



















@z2 dtdz and using






@2 (x ￿ x￿)
















and we expand the term G ￿ G0 as a Taylor series around the optimal path
(x￿ (t;z);u￿ (t;z);v￿ (t;z);￿￿ (t;z)) to obtain





r2G￿￿ + higher order terms, (101)
where rG; r2G are the ￿rst- and second-order FrØchet derivatives of the
Hamiltonian function evaluated at the optimal paths. and
￿ =
￿




"y + "2￿;"￿;"￿;"Y0 + "2Y0￿;"G0;"Y + "2Y￿;"G
￿0 : (102)
Then (98) becomes


















































































v = 0 (106)
_ ￿
￿









X = 0: (107)
33But (106)-(107) are the optimality conditions for problem (79), then
(103) becomes










where all the terms of the quadratic form ￿
0
r2G￿￿ are multiples of "2 or
higher terms. Since the approximation (108) holds along the optimal path,
then assuming that state dynamics start in the neighborhood of the FOSS,
dividing by "2 and taking the limit as " ! 0; we de￿ne the approximation
at the FOSS as









r2 ￿ G￿￿; (109)
where all derivatives are evaluated at the FOSS. Assuming that state dy-
namics start in the neighborhood of the FOSS, dividing by "2 and taking
the limit as " ! 0 we can obtain a ￿ good LQ approximation￿of the nonlin-




where ￿0 = (y;￿;Y0;G0;Y;G): Writing r2 ￿ G￿ = Q and abusing notation by
setting (y;￿;Y0;G0;Y;G) = (x;u;X0;U0;X;U) = ￿0 and ￿ = v; the approx-
























@z2; x(0;z) = x0 (z);







A;B; ￿ A; ￿ B;C
￿
and Q =
[qij];i;j = 1;:::;6 is a (6 ￿ 6) symmetric matrix.
Appendix 2: The derivation of the quadratic form ^ w0 ^ Q ^ w
In the quadratic form ^ w0 ^ Q ^ w the matrix ^ Q is a symmetric (2 ￿ 2) ma-
trix [^ qij];i;j = 1;2: Its elements are derived from the quadratic form ￿0Q￿













= (X0;U0;X;U): Then ￿0Q￿ =
P6
i;j=1 qij￿i￿j:
To make the derivation clear, take i = 1: Then the sum of the terms of


















(t;z) ! ^ K0





(t;z) ! ^ K0
u (!) ^ u(!); (111)




q11 + q13 ^ K0
x (!) + q15 ^ Kx (!)
i
^ x2 (!) + (113)
h
q12 + q14 ^ K0
u (!) + q16 ^ Ku (!)
i
^ x(!) ^ u(!) = ^ Q1 (!): (114)
The same can be repeated for i = 2;:::;6: It is noted that the sum of the


































^ u2 (!): (117)
After performing all calculations and taking common factors of ^ x2 (!);
^ u2 (!); ^ x(!) ^ u(!); we obtain the quadratic form ^ w0 ^ Q ^ w where the elements
of matrix ^ Q(!) are de￿ned in the dual space ^ Z; or the frequency domain,
and depend on the spatial kernels.
Appendix 3: The parameters of the value function of the com-
mercial ￿shery
The parameters of the value function are determined by the solution of
35the following system:
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